President Barack Obama has pointed to Yemen to boast that his new global anti-terror strategy was thriving.
But with Iranian-backed rebels now overrunning the U.S. ally tasked with beating back local al Qaeda affiliates, the nation at the tip of Arabian Peninsula makes a better case study in the approach's limitations.
Yemen was the petri dish for Obama's concept of how to fight Islamic extremists with a hybrid warfare of U.S. drone strikes, special forces and on-the-ground intelligence provided by local partners.
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The theory was that, after learning the bloody lessons of protracted ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States could no longer bear the cost of inserting its large, vulnerable land armies into hostile Muslim nations.
Instead, Washington would eliminate terrorists by partnering with friendly governments and forces in regions as diverse as the Persian Gulf, the Levant and Africa in a more sustainable campaign against Islamic extremism.
But the success of some of these campaigns is in question, as regional allies have proven too weak or disorganized to sustain the anti-terror actions the U.S. is looking for.
For a while, the partnership with Yemen worked. The local government in concert with the CIA and Special Forces assets on the ground, and a deadly umbrella of drone strikes, pinned down the deadliest franchise left in Osama bin Laden's empire, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
But Yemen's instability always threatened to derail the effort and the country's treacherous tribal and political stew finally boiled over in January when Houthi rebels overthrew Washington's latest partner in the capital of Sanaa, President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi.
But with Iranian-backed rebels now overrunning the U.S. ally tasked with beating back local al Qaeda affiliates, the nation at the tip of Arabian Peninsula makes a better case study in the approach's limitations.
Yemen was the petri dish for Obama's concept of how to fight Islamic extremists with a hybrid warfare of U.S. drone strikes, special forces and on-the-ground intelligence provided by local partners.
The theory was that, after learning the bloody lessons of protracted ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States could no longer bear the cost of inserting its large, vulnerable land armies into hostile Muslim nations.
Instead, Washington would eliminate terrorists by partnering with friendly governments and forces in regions as diverse as the Persian Gulf, the Levant and Africa in a more sustainable campaign against Islamic extremism.
But the success of some of these campaigns is in question, as regional allies have proven too weak or disorganized to sustain the anti-terror actions the U.S. is looking for.
For a while, the partnership with Yemen worked. The local government in concert with the CIA and Special Forces assets on the ground, and a deadly umbrella of drone strikes, pinned down the deadliest franchise left in Osama bin Laden's empire, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
But Yemen's instability always threatened to derail the effort and the country's treacherous tribal and political stew finally boiled over in January when Houthi rebels overthrew Washington's latest partner in the capital of Sanaa, President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi.
"It is a strategy that depends on the domestic politics of the particular state which it is applied," said Charles Schmitz, a specialist on Yemen at Towson University.
"The strategy will work if it has the appropriate political circumstances. If it does not have the appropriate circumstances it won't."
When the optimum political conditions in Yemen evaporated, the U.S. effort stumbled.
Sharply deteriorating security led to the closure of the U.S. embassy in Sanaa and the departure of U.S. special forces this week, lifting the pressure on AQAP -- with alarming implications for U.S. security.
Hadi finally fled his country this week, ahead of air strikes led by Saudi Arabia with cooperation from nine other Arab and Muslim-majority countries against the Shiite Houthi rebels which, though unwilling to cooperate with the U.S. campaign, are also fighting AQAP.
The U.S. is providing Saudi Arabia rhetorical support as well as logistics and intelligence, and soon airborne tanker back-up for its campaign.
But even if the operation by the Sunni powers succeeds in Yemen, there seems no easy path back to the restoration of the kind of pro-U.S. government that might make the fight against AQAP sustainable again. Yemen is on the brink of a civil war between Houthis and splintered security forces still loyal to Hadi and a political reconciliation process has ground to a halt.
There certainly remains little to justify Obama's words in September a primetime address to the nation in which he laid out his plan for combating ISIS.
Sharply deteriorating security led to the closure of the U.S. embassy in Sanaa and the departure of U.S. special forces this week, lifting the pressure on AQAP -- with alarming implications for U.S. security.
Hadi finally fled his country this week, ahead of air strikes led by Saudi Arabia with cooperation from nine other Arab and Muslim-majority countries against the Shiite Houthi rebels which, though unwilling to cooperate with the U.S. campaign, are also fighting AQAP.
The U.S. is providing Saudi Arabia rhetorical support as well as logistics and intelligence, and soon airborne tanker back-up for its campaign.
But even if the operation by the Sunni powers succeeds in Yemen, there seems no easy path back to the restoration of the kind of pro-U.S. government that might make the fight against AQAP sustainable again. Yemen is on the brink of a civil war between Houthis and splintered security forces still loyal to Hadi and a political reconciliation process has ground to a halt.
There certainly remains little to justify Obama's words in September a primetime address to the nation in which he laid out his plan for combating ISIS.